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rationalities would prepare people better to interact internationally.
Macintyre's argument for the inclusion of western rationalities would seem
to imply that we should also construct universities ~t ~ open to ~on
westem rationalities. Yet the western concept of ratiOnality as craft nught
be inappropriate to judge eastern or native rationalities.
.
..
What would it mean to bring rival western and non western rationalities
intoouruniversities? Feyerabend has suggested that medical schools should
study traditional medicine as well as western medicine. H instructors in
eastern traditional North American, and homeopathic medicine joinmedical
faculti~I then future doctors would have a greater selection of remedies from
'
which to choose. Relegating native medicine to anthropology puts its
healing power beyond our reach.
.
.
.
Are there any options that one should exclude from a umv~ty of
dialogue and disputation? This is a hard question. I prefer the politically
correct exclusion of creationism since I don't see creationisn\as good science;
yetitmightbestudiedinotherdepartments. But a truly pluralistic university
should include all rationalities, especially those practiced by many members
ofitsownsociety. Iamthereforeinadilemmaoverthebreadthof a truly open
university devoted to disputation and understanding. Macintyre's .Three
Rival Versions Of Moral Ent1Uiry is a clever and wide ranging contribution to
the debate over the purpose of contemporary universities. It successfully
pushes us out of the institutions imprisoned by outmoded Victorian
pedagogical structures into the debates that are emerging from actual
conditions in contemporary social life.
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John Inglis, Lexington

Matthew H. Kramer. Legal Theory, Political Theory, and Deconstruction:
Against Rhadamanthus. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 199L
A text is not a text unless it hides from the first comer, from the first
glance, the law of its composition and the rules of its gan:ie.· A text
remains, moreover, forever imperceptible. Its law and its rules are
not, however, harbored in the inaccessibility of a secret; it is simply
that they can never be booked, in the present, into anything that could
rigorously be called a perception.

Jacques Derrida. Dissemination. Trans. Barbara Johnson. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1981, p. 63.
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Matthew H Kramer's first book is one in which Derrida's quote is taken
at full value. Working his waythrough particular texts, theories, and thinkers
from the traditions of legal and JX>litical theory, Kramer is constantly at pains
make per.ceptible the strategies in.the work he examines by showing why
1t must be unpercepbble. Detennined to elude the accusations and pat
responses that seem to plaguedeconstructivecriticism (e.g. thatitisnihilism),
Kramer is careful inhisengagementof thetextsand traditionsof JX>litical and
legal theory and maintains an awarelle$ of the necessary implications that
flow to his own text from such an approach.
Kramer focuses on three authors and the traditions which surround
them: G.A Cohen and Marxism via Karl Marx's Theory ofHistory, H.L.A. Hart
and Legal Positivism via The Concept of Law, and David Hume and
Conservatism via A Treatise of Human Nature, An Enquiry concerning the
Principle ofMorals, and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Kramer
concludes the book with a chapter on Critical Legal Studies, and it is here
~here his qualified allegiance lies. A brief exegesis on deconstruction
introduces the book and is quite good in familiarizing the reader with
Kramer's particularunderstandingofJacquesDerrida's philosophy. Kramer
also c?ntinues what seems to be a trend in deconstruction scholarship by
assertingthatAmericanliteraryaiticshavesomehowmisconstrued Derrida
andareusinghimfor their own purposes while others, usually philosophers,
really understand Derrida and his project
Kramer's basic strategy is to introduce each author and his tradition and
proceed to give a close reading to a particular text. In doing so, Kramer seeks
to ~n~age the ~ext on its own terms and JX>int out what incongruencies arise.
first reading provides the boundaries by which the textand the tradition
mwhich itis situated claim to bean object By spotlighting this boundaryand
the aporia of inn~ and outemess which structure it, Kramer creates the
space necessary for a strategy of deconstruction, and it is within this space
that he demonstrates the instability of the alleged boundary and the
dependence which each side necessarily involves itself. Kramer wants to
show that this instability is a necessary feature of any text or tradition which
theorizes about social or political life. He states that "[a]ll positions-be they
metaphysical or political-will perforcedismantlethemselvesas thecondition
of their beingelaborated. No position, then, canlayclaim to thedeterminancy
and coherence needed to play the part of an element in a necessary relation"
(p..148). What makes this book interesting, however, is what follows this
claim: "(T]his will be true of deconstructivecritiquesas much as of discourse
that has les.s explicitly thematiz.ed its undoing" (p. 148).
Kramer is roncemed to show deoonstruction at work and convince the
reader ~tit should be employed in the context of legal and political theory.
To do this he understands (as many do not) that the contradictions inherent

disCloswe Fall 1991

RETHINKING CONTEMPORARY MYTHOLOGIES

101

BOOK REVIEWS

BOOK REVIEWS

in the perfonnance of deconstructive strategies must be accounted for. This
must be done not apologetically, but forcefully, and as an integral part of the
critique rather than as an afterthought or footnote. How~ver, in taking. the
stance of deconstruction without apology, Kramer knowingly steps off into
anabyss where politics and deconstruction share a relationship of suspici~n.
Kramer is most explicit about this relationship in that part of the book which
engages the Critical Legal Studies movement and its adoption of the concept
of reification as a way of explaining the history of law and legal theory. In
bringing deconstruction to the legal theory debate, Kramer addresses the
fundamental i$ue--that abstract literary theory can be of little consequence
when intervening in matters which involve real people in concrete legal
cases. Against Marx's distinction between interpreting the world and
changing it, Kramer responds that "for the . . . deronstructive critic, a
reinterpreting of the world~ a changing of it" (p. 245). For ~r, "ev~ry
social practice (as well as every natural phenomenon) compnses ~ynad
forms of categorization, and hence has always succumbed to a vertiginous
interplay between sameness and difference" (p. 246).
In dealing with the thought of G.A Cohen and H.L.A. Hart, Kramer
tosses the monkeywrench of deconstruction into any gap which presents
itself as a result of his close reading. Kramer interrupts the boundaries which
enclose the theories of Cohen and Hart by questioning the very fact of the
boundaries' existence. Every claim to presence by a theory highlights the
dyad of innemes.s and outellle$ (and other conceptual pairings needed for
a systematic theory) and at the same time signals the beginning of the end.
For Cohen, the distinction between sociality and materiality which he
develops as a more enrompassing way to theorize Marx's ~value/
exchange-value relationship sets up
aporia, which nece~1tates
obliteration of this initial distinction. Highlighting the moment of abstraction
which is required for this description, Kramer goes to work: "'materiality' is
always already social, in the sense that it can come into view only as a result
of the procedure (that is, abstraction) which resides at the social end of ~
sociality /materiality split" (p. 87). Substitute any two opposed concepts in
the discourses of legal and political theory and the result is the same-they
will not hold. In Hart's case, it is the distinction between primary and
secondary rules and their relation to the rule of recognition that he depends
upon to make his legal system cohere. Again, Kramer intervenes and the
result is inevitable.
·
This is not to say that Kramer's book is dull or overly formulaic. In or?er
to be successful in his strategy, Kramer must in some sense create the object
of his destruction. Kramer makes the text as systematic and suggestive as~
author claims it to be, and points out problems which arise within thiS
(artificial) sphere. However, once this solidity is established, Kramer does
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~t l~~eit in pieces after it has undergone the scrutiny of deconstruction.

In
his cntique of Hume's proclivity for privileging the particular over the
abstractrequirementsof the social compact, Kramer explains why this would
be impo$ible:
Acri~queofH~e'spri~~gofparticularswillnotautomaticallyimpairthe
~veness of his theonzmg, for any such critique will powerfully reconfirm

uruts m the very process of undermining them; but if the intraphilosophical
effects are so dizzyingly incalculabl~ then one should hesitate before making
predictions about politics. (p. 149)

. :ms hesita~on is ~pable throughout the book, not only in Kramer's
wnting but also m themmd of a reader who is sympathetic to deconstruction
and wishes to situate it within a legal or political theory. Having established
on the level of theory that the moment of deronstruction cannot be denied
and that all dichotomies necessarily subvert themselves, he exhorts those
who engage the problems of law and politics to embrace deconstruction as
?s~ategy in ~eir writing. To Cl$uage the possibility of hesitancy, Kramer,
tn his analysIS of G.A. Cohen, writes that

Just as dec~nstruction l~v~ room for speech-act philosophy and structuralism,
an analySis that has highlighted circularity can leave room for a defense of
Marxism ~d for a~ reading of history. That such projects will ultimately
subvert therr own claims, or beg their own questions does not decrease their
tre~chancy in appropriate contexts-in particular, when they are competing
against other persuasive versions of historical "truth," which will be subject to
similar disruptions. (p. 80)

One immediately wonders when and how a context could arise that did
~ot involve competing versions of historical "truth." When deconstruction
added to this competition a peculiar ethics presents itself. To what
advantage does the political or legal theorist introduce deronstructive
strategi~ int~~ d~te? Although one who enlists such a strategy can offer
devastating lnSlghts into the traditions one seeks to engage, it remains
doubtful what effect such insights will have on one's opponents (the use of
metaphors of battle and struggle pervade Kramer's book). Kramermaintains
that to take a deconstructive stance allows one to "absorb critiques to which
0 ~~'s position must be vulnerable" (p. 268), and because of this he "implores
Clltical legal scholars to brace their methods by undermining and imperiling
[them]" (p.269). Hesistancy redux.
To raise questions about strategy in Kramer's book is not to suggest that
they ha~e gone overlooked. As Kramer notes: '1t may well tum out that
upholding novelty against rigidified structures will promote stagnation far
IS
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more than would a contrary tactic. That, however, seems a gamble_ worth
taking'' (p. 268). However, this gamble should only be taken with full
recogrrltion of the stakes. Inverting Derrida's observation that "to sta~ the
difficulty is not ... to sunnount it'' (p. 268), one should also note that net~
has one surmounted the solution by stating it. Although deconstruction
opens up many avenues for intervention in political and legal theory, both
sides of the dyads around which deconstruction operates are deeply
entrenched. This entrenchment has sites both within the academy and
without. To treat them as "merely'' literary is to seriously weaken the
possibility of using deconstruction as an effective ~?f interventi?n. 'The
strength of Kramer's book is that he recogniz.es
His .~ose reading of a
selection of texts which give sustenance to the main traditions of legal and
political theory is instructive, and should
as a ~r~ mod~ for
those working within these traditions especially Critical Legal Studies.
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Greg Howard, Lexington

Barnett Newman&lected Writings and Jnteruiews. Edited by John P.
O'Neill, Text Notes and Commentary by Mollie McNickle, Introduction
by Richard Shiff. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990.
Though Barnett Newman wrote more and more persuasively~.any
of his colleagues in the early-'50s school known as Abstract Express1orus,m,
he still remains perhaps the most misunderstood painter in what was the first
modem American art movement to free itself in any significant way from
European tethers. In that we have learned to enter Rothko's col~r .field,
Pollock's web, or De I<ooning's splashy landscape, we have not assimilated
Newman into a popular understanding. One can stand in the circular room
of the National Gallery in D.C. where Newman's fourteen "Stations of the
Cross" hang, and witness the perplexity coupled with derision that crosses
viewers' faces as theyencounterthese8-footcanvases, soasceticallyrendei:c1
that they appear nearly bare, simply "framed" with strips of black or white.
How does one go about explaining to the uninitiated thatittookNewman43
years to arrive at this style? One could retaliate in the manner of Ado~ that
'1f one does not understand something, it is customary to behave with the
sublime understanding of Mahler's jackass,and projectone' sowninadequacy
on to the object, declaring it to be incomprehensible." But Newman seldom
took such high ground. Rather,he tried insistently to explain his art and other
like it to an unfamiliar public and critics alike. Selected Writings offers more
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than ample insight into the resilient psyche of the man who claimed that to
understand one of his paintings "would mean the end of state capitalism
and totalitarianism" (p. 247).
·
Before Newman painted his seminal "Onement I" in 1948 a maroon
canvas with one orange stripe, or "zip" down the center-he was a relen~
proselytizer for the abstract art movement in America. He claimed it was the
true American fonn-"barbaric" and primitive, owing nothing to European
notions of representation, which he claimed were simply derivations of
classicism. ''For the artist in America has the special privilege of being told
and reminded every minµte of his state of futility. The world here makes no
bargain of expediency with him in the name of culture'' (p. 112), wrote
Newman. Instead, he praised throughout his life the raw sculpture of
Oceanic and South Sea tribes, with rhetoric that never fell into the racist
implications of psychic savagery that became popular in lieu of surrealism.
Rather, Newman emphasiz.ed the "elemental mystery of life" that these
sculptures sought to embody and combat Primitiveartwasneverdecorative,
never interested in polished surfaces. Rather it was always totemic, more
metaphysical, more "intellectual" in its grapplingwith the chaos of nature.
By examining primitive cultures in the Americas, Newman anived at
the conviction that rontemporary art had become impotent and styliz.ed
because it emerged ·from only one tradition--classicism. Newman had
begun thinking about the "Other" decades before it was vogue in this
country. 'We are to admit that the emperor has no clothes,N he wrote, "for to
do so-to admit that primitive art can move us without resorting to the
sensuous elements to which we are accustomed-may prove to be a denial
of our Western European aesthetics" (p. 146).
In the spring of 1945, in a long essay called "The Plasmic Image,"
Newman began seriously to search for a new "language" fu which topainta new beginning separate from Europe. The myth of ''beauty" was obsolete,
ornamental, "plastic." In light of the horrors that were unfolding in Europe,
such facile art was unfathomable for Newman. He searched for a "plasmic,"
philosophical fonn that would allow him to exp~ all of the anguish
primitive people must have felt at the mercy of forces they could not
comprehend.
Newman never lost his ambition to express man's relation to the
transcendental. He simply thought that the European's "relation to the
Absolute became identified and confused with the absolutisms of perfect
creations-with the fetish of quality-so that the European artist has been
continually involved in the moral struggle between notions of beauty and the
desire for sublimity" (p.171). The crucial question then became for Newman,
"if we are living in a time without a legend or mythos that can be called
sublime, if we refuse to admit any exaltation in pure relations, if we refuse to
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